The child was 2 years, 8 months old and weighed 25 pounds, one-fifth the weight of her mother, for whom she was to be the bone marrow donor. The mother had suffered a relapse of acute myelogenous leukemia; her physicians recommended a bone marrow transplant. The child was the closest human leukocyte antigen match and thus the best donor candidate for her mother's transplant.

It might be expected that it would suffice for the entry for “moral anti-realism” to contain only some links to other entries in this encyclopedia. It could contain a link to “moral realism” and stipulate the negation of the view there described. Alternatively, it could have links to the entries “anti-realism” and “morality” and could stipulate the conjunction of the materials contained therein. The fact that neither of these approaches would be adequate—and, more strikingly, that following the two procedures would (...) yield substantively non-equivalent results—reveals the contentious and unsettled nature of the topic. -/- “Anti-realism,” “non-realism,” and “irrealism” may for most purposes be treated as synonymous. Occasionally, distinctions have been suggested for local pedagogic reasons (see, e.g., Wright 1988a; Dreier 2004), but no such distinction has generally taken hold. (“Quasi-realism” denotes something very different, to be discussed in the supplement Projectivism and quasi-realism below.) All three terms are to be defined in opposition to realism, but since there is no consensus on how “realism” is to be understood, “anti-realism” fares no better. Crispin Wright (1992: 1) comments that “if there ever was a consensus of understanding about ‘realism’, as a philosophical term of art, it has undoubtedly been fragmented by the pressures exerted by the various debates—so much so that a philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science, for example, or ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more than to clear her throat.” This entry doesn't purport to do justice to the intricacy and subtlety of the topic of realism; it should be acknowledged at the outset that the fragmentation of which Wright speaks renders it unlikely that the label “moral anti-realism” even succeeds in picking out a definite position. Yet perhaps we can at least make an advance on clearing our throats. (shrink)

Robert Mayhew’s Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Republic focuses on Aristotle’s main objections to Plato’s political philosophy: the degree of unity envisioned by Plato is impossible/undesirable; too much unity undermines self-sufficiency; community of women and children and community of property have numerous adverse effects on society. Mayhew claims that the objections have been largely ignored on the ground that they are facile or unfair. But the purpose of the book is not to show that Aristotle’s thought has been unjustifiably vilified, though (...) Mayhew says that “we shall see in passing that in most cases Aristotle’s criticisms of the Republic are well-founded”. The book’s purpose is to see how the objections illuminate the rest of Aristotle’s political thought. I do not think that Mayhew succeeds in showing either that the arguments are well founded or that they provide interesting illumination. I discuss unity and community of women and property. (shrink)

I argue that desire satisfaction theories of welfare are not committed to the view that changes in welfare levels can happen after death, or that events that occur after death impact the agent's welfare levels now. My argument is that events that occur after death have only epistemological import. They may reveal that the person was successful (unsuccessful) in life, but the desire was already frustrated or satisfied before the person died. The virtue of the account is that it gives (...) us a way to acknowledge both the intuition that we cannot be harmed after we die and, in a sense, the intuition that things that happen after we die are relevant to our lives. (shrink)

Kids will discover the stories of people like Jeff Boyer, an Iowa farmer who was forced to evacuate his farm and leave behind his 3,500 pigs.

It has been almost twenty‐five years since Huberman and Riggs first showed that there are multiple bidirectional origins of replication scattered at ∼100 kb intervals along mammalian chromosomal fibers. Since that time, every conceivable physical property unique to replicating DNA has been taken advantage of to determine whether origins of replication are defined sequence elements, as they are in microorganisms. The most thoroughly studied mammalian locus to date is the dihydrofolate reductase domain of Chinese hamster cells, which will be used (...) as a model to discuss the various methods of investigation. While several laboratories agree on the rough location of the [initiation locus] in this large chromosomal domain, different experimental approaches paint different pictures of the mechanism by which initiation occurs. However, a variety of new techniques and synchronizing agents promises to clarify the picture for this particular locus, and to provide the means for identifying and isolating other origins of replication for comparison. (shrink)

Aristotle distinguishes three types of friendship: virtue or character friendship, advantage friendship, and pleasure friendship. He also holds that the civic relation is a friendship, but it is unclear to which of the three types it belongs. There appear to be two candidates. It is either a character friendship, or an advantage friendship. I argue that it cannot be a character friendship, since that would entail that citizens have active goodwill toward one another, and Aristotle claims that such goodwill can (...) exist only among a few relatively rare character friends. However, if the relation is not a character friendship, Aristotle’s claim that the city is more than alliance for security and exchange becomes puzzling. I argue that Aristotle’s view is that the civic friendship is a special type of advantage friendship in that one of its advantages is that it makes character friendships possible. This explains why rulers and citizens should want their fellows not only to act virtuously, but also to be virtuous. (shrink)

Aristotle quoted the "timaeus" more than any other dialogue of plato. these quotations are here analyzed at length for their accuracy and what they reveal about aristotle's agreement or disagreement with his mentor. seven topics are treated: the receptacle, simple bodies, qualities, motion, time, the soul, and scientific method. subsidiary topics include: space, weight, natural law, psycho-somatic relations, and implications for modern science. the conclusion is drawn that aristotle correctly reports plato, and agrees with his general emphases, although he uses (...) fresh, original explanations. (shrink)

Aristotle distinguishes three types of friendship: virtue or character friendship, advantage friendship, and pleasure friendship. He also holds that the civic relation is a friendship, but it is unclear to which of the three types it belongs. There appear to be two candidates. It is either a character friendship, or an advantage friendship. I argue that it cannot be a character friendship, since that would entail that citizens have active goodwill toward one another, and Aristotle claims that such goodwill can (...) exist only among a few relatively rare character friends. However, if the relation is not a character friendship, Aristotle’s claim that the city is more than alliance for security and exchange becomes puzzling. I argue that Aristotle’s view is that the civic friendship is a special type of advantage friendship in that one of its advantages is that it makes character friendships possible. This explains why rulers and citizens should want their fellows not only to act virtuously, but also to be virtuous. (shrink)

Dans ce volume collectif, J. Albisetti, J. Goodman et Rebecca Rogers nous emmènent dans un tour européen du développement de l’enseignement secondaire pour les filles. Les contributeurs proposent deux pistes principales : une vue d’ensemble des histoires nationales de l’enseignement des filles ; et une présentation des pistes de recherche à suivre. Bien que Girls’ Secondary Education in the Western World soit organisé par pays, les directeurs et les auteurs soulignent les multiples connexions...

Provability logics with many modal operators for progressions of theories obtained by iterating their consistency statements are introduced. The corresponding arithmetical completeness theorem is proved.

Robert Mayhew’s Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Republic focuses on Aristotle’s main objections to Plato’s political philosophy: the degree of unity envisioned by Plato is impossible/undesirable; too much unity undermines self-sufficiency; community of women and children and community of property have numerous adverse effects on society. Mayhew claims that the objections have been largely ignored on the ground that they are facile or unfair. But the purpose of the book is not to show that Aristotle’s thought has been unjustifiably vilified, though (...) Mayhew says that “we shall see in passing that in most cases Aristotle’s criticisms of the Republic are well-founded”. The book’s purpose is to see how the objections illuminate the rest of Aristotle’s political thought. I do not think that Mayhew succeeds in showing either that the arguments are well founded or that they provide interesting illumination. I discuss unity and community of women and property. (shrink)

Expressivists about normative thought and discourse traditionally deny that there are nondeflationary normative propositions. However, it has recently been suggested that expressivists might avoid a number of problems by providing a theory of normative propositions compatible with expressivism. This paper explores the prospects for developing an expressivist theory of propositions within the framework of cognitive act theories of propositions. First, I argue that the only extant expressivist theory of cognitive propositions—Michael Ridge's ‘ecumenical expressivist’ theory—fails to explain identity conditions for normative (...) propositions. Second, I argue that this failure motivates a general constraint—the ‘unity requirement’—that any expressivist theory of propositions must provide a unified nonrepresentational explanation of that in virtue of which propositional attitudes have the content that they have. Third, I argue that conceptual role accounts of content provide a promising framework in which to develop an expressivist theory of cognitive propositions. (shrink)

In their paper, “Helpful Lessons and Cautionary Tales: How Should COVID-19 Drug Development and Access Inform Approaches to Non-Pandemic Diseases?” Holly Fernandez Lynch and colleagues have present...

The shape of a life hypothesis holds that the temporal sequence of good or bad times in a life can itself be a valuable feature of that life. This is generally thought to be incompatible with additivism about lifetime well-being, which holds that lifetime well-being is fully determined by momentary well-being. This discussion examines Dale Dorsey’s recent argument that these views are in fact compatible. I argue that accepting the conjunction of these views requires stronger commitments than Dorsey recognizes. After (...) arguing that these commitments are problematic, I conclude that we should reject the compatibility claim. (shrink)

Much of the mathematics with which Felix Klein and Sophus Lie are now associated (Klein’s Erlangen Program and Lie’s theory of transformation groups) is rooted in ideas they developed in their early work: the consideration of geometric objects or properties preserved by systems of transformations. As early as 1870, Lie studied particular examples of what he later called contact transformations, which preserve tangency and which came to play a crucial role in his systematic study of transformation groups and differential equations. (...) This note examines Klein’s efforts in the 1870s to interpret contact transformations in terms of connexes and traces that interpretation (which included a false assumption) over the decades that follow. The analysis passes from Klein’s letters to Lie through Lindemann’s edition of Clebsch’s lectures on geometry in 1876, Lie’s criticism of it in his treatise on transformation groups in 1893, and the careful development of that interpretation by Dohmen, a student of Engel, in his 1905 dissertation. The now-obscure notion of connexes and its relation to Lie’s line elements and surface elements are discussed here in some detail. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Citation and Modernity: Derrida, Joyce, and BrechtHarvey L. HixCitation and Modernity: Derrida, Joyce, and Brecht, by Claudette Sartiliot; xiii & 173 pp. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993, $15.95 paper.Claudette Sartiliot argues that “the traditional definition of citation” is “inadequate and outmoded” (p. 15). It no longer applies to modernist and postmodernist writers, for whom “quotation represents a definite break with the tradition as well as (...) a means of questioning the nature of the literary text” (p. 3). The traditional definition, derived from classical rhetoric, limits quotation to the purpose of illustration and ornament. In contrast, modernist and postmodernist citational practices, having abandoned the typographical separation of the quotation from the “main” text, question “the concept of text as an autonomous entity” and replace the idea of a book “by the more unbounded word discourse” (p. 20).To illustrate her point, Sartiliot appeals first to Derrida’s Glas, which “relies on citation to such an extent that it can serve as a paradigm for a theory of quotation” (p. 35). By juxtaposing two columns of text and by extensive quotation, Derrida (a) links quotation with violence and with sexual penetration, (b) stages “a game of appearance and disappearance” through which he evades the reader’s attempts to “pin him down” (p. 42), (c) reveals that words contain within themselves other words, (d) blurs boundaries between languages and disciplines, and (e) “demonstrates how meaning is generated through an aleatory scattering of semes” (p. 57).Sartiliot also attends to Joyce and Brecht, who achieve similar ends through their citational practices: “both have elevated ‘plagiarism’ to the level of originality” and both “have shown that writing is always and inevitably quoting” (p. 75). Because everything in Finnegans Wake is a quotation—even the characters—Joyce undercuts meaning: a text without boundaries cannot be ingested. Finnegans Wake is like quantum physics: “neither intimated that God was dead, but both confronted the world with a model of representation that intimated that ‘God played dice’” (p. 84).Brecht’s characters, like those of Finnegans Wake, are quotations rather than originals: “empty signifiers” whose very names are not their own, they challenge “the bourgeois myth of the identity and continuity of the subject” (p. 130). [End Page 367] As Copernicus removes humanity from the center of the universe and Marx removes humanity from the center of history, so Brecht removes humanity from the center of theatrical representation, revealing that “the subject as a fully present identity and entity” is delusory, and humanity is “a linguistic (and thus political) construct” (p. 124). In sum, by their citational practices Derrida, Joyce, and Brecht question “the notions of origin, closure, and authorship associated with the conception of the book” (p. 124).Citation and Modernity contains moments of insight. For instance, Sartiliot says of Finnegans Wake that “while Joyce was doing away with quotation marks in his own texts, he was forcing his critics to surround most of their critical terms with quotation marks, as a sore sign [sic] of their inability to find the right word to describe what he was doing” (p. 75). In other respects, however, her book is not satisfying. The most obvious problem is that her own citational practices contradict her thesis. After writers like Derrida, Joyce, and Brecht, she says, we can no longer return to traditional quotation based on classical rhetoric, yet her own quotation is strictly traditional: it illustrates and ornaments, and maintains a clear distinction between her own words and those belonging to someone else.There are other failures to live up to the book’s own standards. Sartiliot claims that the chief purpose of quotation is to attack the authority of the quoted father, to “subvert the notions of filiation and tradition” (p. 149) and “eclipse the precursor” (p. 8), yet her own book steadfastly upholds filiation and tradition. From the cover, which makes much of her having been a student of Derrida, to the pervasive jargon (totalization, hymen, logocentrism, dissemination, etc.), the book defers all too consistently to the authority of its father, and consequently fails to challenge its readers.Harvey L. HixKansas City Art InstituteCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

1. 4. 9. Fugite delicias, fugite enervantem felicitatem, qua animi permadescunt et, nisi aliquid intervenit quod humanae sortis admoneat, †velut perpetua ebrietate sopitif†. Although it is possible to produce a tolerable sentence by deleting et after permadescunt, it is generally agreed that a verb is missing in the last clause. Koch suggested sopiti, Gertz sopiti (...) manent Hermes, vivunt Schultess, languent Viansino. One would hesitate to add to the growing clutter of suggestions, did not one of Seneca's favourite verbs seem to meet all requirements, namely marcent. Cf. ben. 4. 6. 3 ‘quies in qua putrescis ac marces’; 4. 13. 1 ‘vobis voluptas est… securitatem sopitis simillimam adpetere e t … animi marcentis oblectare torporem’; dial. 1. 3. 10 ‘hunc voluptatibus marcidumet felicitate nimia laborantem’; 9. 2. 6; 10. 2. 2; epist. 74. 1; 89. 18 et al. (shrink)

The manuscript tradition of Seneca's Dialogues consists of one eleventhcentury manuscript, Ambrosianus C 90 inf. , which is the main source for the text, and a ruck of later manuscripts of lesser and disputed worth. There are over a hundred of these, far more than has been supposed.

The manuscript tradition of Seneca'sDialoguesconsists of one eleventhcentury manuscript, Ambrosianus C 90 inf., which is the main source for the text, and a ruck of later manuscripts of lesser and disputed worth. There are over a hundred of these, far more than has been supposed.